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Abstract
The purpose of this article is twofold: to illuminate Foucault by looking at the Mishnah, and to illuminate the Mishnah by looking at Foucault. We argue that the Mishnah challenges the universality of Foucault’s claims about ancient thought. Yet, at the same time, Foucault’s framework helps to highlights ways in which the Mishnah can be read as a signpost for advancing contemporary philosophical thought. While in its outward form, the Mishnah puts forth an account of normative-legal duties to God and to human beings, we show that it can also be read as an exemplary instance of an ethics without a substantialist ontology. 
Introduction 
Milchman and Rosenberg suggest that “the vast and multifaceted tradition of Hebrew thought may provide readers of Foucault with the possibility of expanding upon his work,” and that the Talmud can be read in a way that “constitutes a challenge to the dominant tradition of Western metaphysics.”​[1]​ The project of mining Hebrew thought for resources for challenging Western metaphysics would, as Milchman and Rosenberg know, have made Nietzsche laugh. “Metaphysics” as the antagonist of critical thought was first established by Nietzsche in Human, All Too Human, who describes it as any perspective that separates the world into the substantial facts and insubstantial chimeras, based on a division between existence and essence. “All metaphysics has dealt primarily with substance,” opposing it to insubstantial appearance or non-being.​[2]​ Though Nietzsche believes that it was Christianity above all that bequeathed to contemporary culture and science such a conception, he believes that the ground for it was prepared by ‘Jewish’ thought: “A Jesus Christ was only possible in a Jewish landscape.”​[3]​ In dialogue with Nietzsche, Heidegger situates “Western metaphysics” as the belief that reality is comprised of facts. He finds this perspective across the philosophical canon as well as in everyday European culture, and discerns that it is underpinned by the presumption that the ground for all the non-accidental properties of real things in the world – including the human subject – lies in substance: “Ousia, presence, is thought as substantia. The concept of substance... dominates together with actualitas the essential character of Being in the metaphysics” of Western philosophy and culture.​[4]​ 
Heidegger’s comments on substance require some unpacking. In chapter Zeta of The Metaphysics, Aristotle argues that “ousia” has four properties: it exists in itself; it endures over time; it stands ontologically separate and distinct; and it is the cause or underpinning principle of reality. The abstract noun ousia was generally translated into Medieval Latin by Christian theologians such as Aquinas using the term “substantia” (lit. that which underlies), “substance.” As a noun, ousia derives from the verbal form “einai”; Aristotle referred to “to ti ên einai” (lit. the what it is to be) or “ti esti” (the what it is). These whole phrases were replaced by the Medieval Christian theologians with the neologism essentia, “essence,” taken to mean the intrinsic properties that constitute a phenomenon. Heidegger suggests that this account of reality, prepared for by the thought of Aristotle and cemented by Christian theology, divides between the substantial and the insubstantial, the true and the accidental, the meaningful and the valueless. Adorno adds in his lectures on Metaphysics: Concepts and Problems, that this division, as applied to human beings, operates not only within ontological but also within ethical discourses, and helped prepare the ground for the Western atrocities of the twentieth century.​[5]​ 
What might Foucauldian reflections on classical rabbinic literature be able to contribute to thinking beyond a foundationalist ethical conceptualisation, with its attendant problems? In addressing this question, our enterprise responds to calls by scholars such as Milchman and Rosenberg for further work at the intersection between Foucauldian and rabbinic thought.​[6]​ We present a description of classical rabbinic reasoning in the Mishnah as relatively unconcerned with what Foucault terms the “ethical substance,” the part of the self upon which the individual needs to work in order to live a moral life, in contrast to the “metaphysical” tradition which has oriented Greek, Christian and contemporary Western ethical discourses. Rather than substantialising a concept of the human being as the fundamental ground for an ethical system, we argue that the Mishnah attempts to ground ethics in the practices of human beings. 
A highway code?
Before delving into the details of the Mishnah, however, we first want to ward off a potential objection.  We argue that the Mishnah represents a framework of thought in which a core category posited by Foucault as supposedly universal – namely, ethical substance – is notably absent.  Some, however, might be inclined to dismiss the significance of such a claim: while perhaps acknowledging the absence of ethical substance in Mishnah, they might say that such an absence is trivial, because the Mishnah is not an “ethical-philosophical” text, but rather a “law code.”  While the absence of ethical substance in an ethical-philosophical text would be significant, its absence from a “law code” is of no more significant than would be the absence of ethical substance in the British Highway Code – to borrow an example from E.P. Sanders.​[7]​
In response to such an objection, the following points can be highlighted.  First of all, as we discuss below, it is by no means obvious that “law code” represents the most appropriate description of the Mishnah, and other proposed designations such as “pedagogical manual” may already point towards the fittingness of analyzing the Mishnah as a system of ethical guidance, in relation to which the absence of ethical substance would indeed be significant.  Secondly, while it is the case that the Mishnah does display a pattern of “legal” form and style, the notion that such a presentation necessarily stands in contrast to “philosophical” or “ethical” reflection is an assumption which recent studies have strongly challenged.  While the Mishnah’s outward form and topical focus do certainly differ from that of classical Greek philosophical texts,​[8]​ one should not exclusively identify the latter with ethical or philosophical reflection tout court.   Recent scholars of the Mishnah such as Steven Fraade and Moshe Simon-Shoshan, drawing on legal theorists such as Peter Brooks, have challenged the dichotomy between halacha and aggada, thus undermining the notion of a sharp divide between law, on the one hand, and ethics, narrative, and philosophy, on the other.​[9]​  By highlighting ways in which the “legal” form can in fact function “with significant paideic reverbations”​[10]​ as a means of conveying complex worldviews and conceptual argumentation, such studies show that the mode of reasoning that would say “The Mishnah is legal and therefore not ethical-philosophical” is one that merely reasserts a questionable binary.  We therefore maintain that the ethical-philosophical analysis applied to the Mishnah in the present essay is by no means a category error.
Finally, while this essay focuses primarily on the Mishnah, we suggest that the absence of ethical substance is by no means limited to the Mishnah alone.  Rather, this absence seems to be a prominent feature in classical rabbinic literature more broadly.  Even if the absence of ethical substance from a “legal” text like the Mishnah might strike some as less significant, Jonathan Schofer has maintained that it is quite difficult to find a correlate to Foucault’s “ethical substance” even in more explicitly ethical-aggadic texts such as Avot de-Rabbi Nathan.​[11]​  While Schofer points to the yetzer ha-ra as one possible correlate, we argue below that Ishay Rosen-Zvi’s “demonological” account of the yetzer casts doubt on such an identification.​[12]​  Accordingly, the absence of ethical substance from Avot de-Rabbi Nathan seems like a quite distinct possibility, and points towards its possible absence from classical rabbinic texts in general.  While future studies would be necessary to confirm this broader hypothesis, it adds strength to our argument that the absence of ethical substance from the Mishnah should not simply be attributed to its “legal” form.  Rather, when we consider its absence from other rabbinic texts as well, we may come to see that the “law-like” formulations of the Mishnah, far from inherently indicating a “non-philosophical” mode of thought, might in fact represent an ethical-philosophical form that is highly apposite precisely for the task of conveying an ethics without substance.   

The ethical substance
In Volume 2 of The History of Sexuality, Foucault draws a distinction between morality and ethics. “By ‘morality,’ one means the set of values and rules of action that are recommended to individuals through the intermediary of various prescriptive agencies.” These moral values and rules may exist as a “moral code,” perhaps embodied by a compendium or guide of explicit instructions, though they may also be “transmitted in a diffuse manner, so that, far from constituting a systematic ensemble, they form a complex interplay of elements that counterbalance and correct one another.” The moral code, in turn, is mediated through the “moral conduct.” This is the manner in which concrete individuals in practice “obey or resist and interdiction or prescription; the manner in which they respect or disregard a set of values.”​[13]​ Some moralities, Foucault notes, may focus more on the moral code, “on its systematicity, its richness, its capacity to adjust to every possible case” and in which “subjectivation occurs basically in a quasi-juridical form.”​[14]​ Other moralities, by contrast, may focus on the area of moral conduct or “ethics,” in which “the exact observance may be relatively unimportant, at least compared with what is required of the individual in the relationship he has with himself.”​[15]​ Through this precise account, Foucault is thereby able to isolate a region he terms “ethics”: the ‘different ways for the individual to operate’ with respect to their moral code and behaviours. 
Foucault then designates four aspects of ethics. The first is the “ethical substance,” which is “the way in which the individual has to constitute this or that part of himself as the prime material of his moral conduct.”​[16]​ For instance, for the Greeks this ethical substance was aphrodisia, acts at the intersection of pleasure and desire. For Christianity, the ethical substance was desire, especially in its capacity for excess or error in the form of concupiscence. And “in our society the main field of morality, the part of ourselves which is most relevant for morality, is our feelings.”​[17]​ The “ethical substance” can be discerned in response to the question: what is the part of the self about which one must be concerned in order to act in a moral way? The second is the “mode of subjectivation,” “the way in which the individual establishes his relation to the rule and recognises himself as obligated to put it into practice.”​[18]​ Foucault illustrates this concept by noting that the same fidelity to one’s heterosexual partner may be motivated by allegiance to a group norm, to a past or emerging spiritual tradition, or to give one’s life a particular beauty, nobility or perfection. The “mode of subjectivation” can be discerned in response to the question: in what way is the individual enjoined to recognise themselves as obligated to live in a moral way? A third aspect of ethics is the ascesis or “ethical work that one performs on oneself, not only in order to bring one’s conduct into compliance with a given rule, but to attempt to transform oneself into the ethical subject of one’s behaviour.” Ethical work may be enacted through a variety of practices, ranging from “a long effort of learning, memorisation, and assimilation of a systematic ensemble of precepts,” through to “a sudden, all-embracing, and definitive renunciation of pleasures.”​[19]​ The “ethical work” can be discerned by asking: what must a person do to the ethical substance in order to live in a moral way? Finally, the “telos” is the goal that the individual would like to aspire through their ethical work. It can be discerned by asking: what form of being do we wish to achieve when we act in a moral way?
Bringing his taxonomy together, Foucault asserts: 
All moral action involves a relationship with the reality in which it is carried out, and a relationship with the self. The latter is not simply ‘self-awareness’ but the self-formation as an ‘ethical subject’, a process in which the individual delimits that part of himself that will form the object of his moral practice [the ethical substance], defines his position relative to the precept he will follow [the mode of subjectivation], and decides on a certain mode of being that will serve as his moral goal [the telos]. And this requires him to act upon, to monitor, test, improve, and transform himself [the ethical work].​[20]​
Elsewhere, summing up his genealogy of the changes in the way Western subjects have constituted themselves as moral agents, Foucault writes that “the substance éthique [ethical substance] for the Greeks was the aphrodisia; the mode d’assujettissement [mode of subjectivation] was a politico-aesthetic choice; the form d’ascèse [form of ascesis; ethical work] was the tekhnē that was used – and there we find, for example, the tekhnē about the body, or economics as the rules by which you define your role as husband... and the téléologie [teleology] was the mastery of oneself.”​[21]​ By contrast, in Christianity “all this ethics has changed. Because the telos has changed: the telos is immortality, purity, and so on. The asceticism has changed, because now self-examination takes the form of self-deciphering. The mode d’assujettissement [mode of subjectivation] is now divine law. And I think that even the ethical substance has changed, because it is not aphrodisia, but desire, concupiscence, flesh, and so on.”​[22]​ 
Except in passing,​[23]​ it has been little noted by scholars that Foucault’s reference to telos and substance gestures towards a link between this account of ethics and Aristotle’s division between ‘four causes.’​[24]​ The two accounts are sufficiently aligned that they may be superimposed. For Aristotle, the material cause is the “the result of whose presence something comes into being.” He distinguishes between “matter,” which is the material cause of non-human things, and “primary substance” which is the material cause of human beings (secondary substance being the material cause of species, and also man-made objects). Aristotle’s formal cause is the arrangement or mode of this substance, parallel to Foucault’s ‘mode of subjectivation.’ The efficient cause is the factor or factors that work upon, changing or stabilising the phenomenon – equivalent to Foucault’s “ethical work.” The final cause is the phenomenon’s aim or purpose, termed “telos” by both Aristotle and Foucault.
Attention to this Aristotelian taxonomy helps to bring out the stakes in the role played by Foucault’s concept of the “ethical substance.” The ethical substance hinges ethics with ontology, by designating the nature of the human being. It also combines with the telos to pick out the ideal truth of this human nature. Thus Foucault describes the way in which “Christianity substituted the idea of a self that one had to renounce, because clinging to the self was opposed to God’s will, for the idea of a self that had to be created as a work of art” in Greek and Stoic thought.​[25]​ With purity situated as the essential, ontological foundation of existence, purity became the telos of fourth century Christianity. In turn desire, concupiscence and the flesh, each framed as deviations from purity, became organised as the ethical substance. This division between the purity of the truth and the manifest existence of each human subject which must therefore be “corrected” went on to become what Foucault calls a “permanent anthropologism of Western thought.”​[26]​ 
Yet the alignment with Aristotle’s taxonomy also suggests the historicity of Foucault’s account. Boyarin and Castelli have proposed that it would be valuable to identify “possible counterexamples from Jewish cultural history” which “might put into question some of the central claims of Foucault’s genealogies.”​[27]​ We wish to suggest that while Foucault’s account of ethics is drawn from and most adapted to Hellenistic and post-Hellenistic cultures, its historical specificity can have value in itself in facilitating identification of differences among ethical systems. Part of the power of Foucault’s fourfold classification of ethics is that it can not only help articulate differences among cultures within the “permanent anthropologism of Western thought,” but also aid in examining ethical systems that by degrees diverge from the dominant metaphysics of identity. As Foucault himself remarks, the study of different cultures can be a source of critical knowledge, since such investigations can provide access to “an undoubted and inexhaustible treasure-hoard of experiences and concepts, and above all a perpetual principle of dissatisfaction, of calling into question, or criticism and contestation of what may seem, in other respects, to be established.”​[28]​ Specifically, we shall argue that an important text from the history of Rabbinic Judaism, the Mishnah, calls into question Foucault’s presumption that any ethical system will possess an ethical substance, ascesis (ethical work), a mode of subjectivation and a telos. Whilst it may be true that “the rabbis were participating in the broader spiritual landscape of late antiquity,” we aim to complicate the claims of those like Satlow who assert that “when the rabbis, then, understood what it meant to be human” they “shared a mentalité” with the Hellenistic culture of Late Antiquity, and that therefore “talmud torah served the same function as philosophy did for non-Jewish writers.”​[29]​ 

Blessings
The Mishnah, edited orally around 200 C.E., is the foundational text of rabbinic Judaism and constitutes the core of the “Oral Torah.” On the surface, it is formulated as an organized series of legal judgments on a wide variety of matters, ranging from the time of day that particular prayers are to be recited, to the ritual status of menstruating women, to the details of criminal and civil court cases. While generally addressing topics mentioned in the text of the Hebrew Bible, the Mishnah presents itself as relaying an independent source of authority, and its contents came to be associated in rabbinic tradition with teachings passed down orally from Moses at Mount Sinai. Alongside the Hebrew Bible, it constitutes a fundamental canonical text of the rabbinic Jewish tradition. The Mishnah is often subsumed as part of the Talmud, alongside the Gemara, which comments upon the Mishnah and was redacted some three centuries after it. However, the Mishnah itself often displays quite different literary and stylistic properties from the Gemara, and for the purposes of this study we will focus our attention on the former. 
One unresolved question is the genre of the Mishnah as a whole. Hayes, surveying the academic literature, notes that it remains an open question as to whether “the Mishnah [is] to be understood as a legal code (following J. N. Epstein and E. E. Urbach), a loose anthology of sources (following Chanoch Albeck), or a pedagogical manual (following Abraham Goldberg).”​[30]​ Seen from any of these three perspectives, the Mishnah can still be regarded as the kind of text that Foucault describes as apt for study in the investigation of moral systems, and the ethical relation with the self that they contain. Such texts, concerned with ethics, are “written for the purpose of offering rules, opinions, and advice on how to behave as one should: ‘practical’ texts, which are themselves objects of a ‘practice’ in that they were designed to be read, learned, reflected upon, and tested out, and they were intended to constitute the eventual framework of everyday conduct.”​[31]​ 
Amongst the corpus of text that comprises to Mishnah, tractate Avot stands out as containing no legal discussions but instead a set of moral maxims. Yet, it has often been treated as the exception that proves the rule that the rest of the Mishnah should be regarded as legal code rather than as having philosophical stakes. In response this assumption, rather than focusing on Avot, we here wish to demonstrate our argument regarding the philosophical implications of early rabbinic thought on the ostensibly more barren ground of the apparently legal chapters. Let us begin with Berakhot, the first tractate of the first of the six Orders of the Mishnah. Contained in this tractate is an account of blessing, elaborated as a discursive practice. In particular, the final chapter of the tractate begins:
One who beholds a place where miracles were wrought for Israel says ‘Blessed is He ... who wrought miracles for our ancestors in this place.’ [One who sees] a place from which idolatry has been uprooted says ‘Blessed is He ... who uprooted idolatry from our land.​[32]​
Though framed as decontextualised prescriptions, these injunctions can be fruitfully read as doing narrative work.  The passage does not directly describe any ontological qualities of the “ideal self,” yet we can view it as presenting an account in which one can come to know or recognize the ideal self on the basis of that self’s characteristic actions.  Thus, on the most basic level, the ideal self is characterized as one who recites the proper blessings on seeing places of past miracle-working or past idolatry-uprooting.  Already, however, this description could be seen as functionally equivalent to saying: the ideal self is one who possesses the quality of discernment and judgment; through the activation of such qualities, the person is able to properly distinguish special sites and locations that call for blessing from more ordinary and mundane sites.  Yet, it is notable that the passages do not explicitly describe such attributes or qualities (discernment, judgment, etc.) – those elements that a self has or is – but instead simply states what such a self does.  All we have are linked pairs of actions: the one who sees X, says Y. For the ideal self, the occurrence of the first action should bring about the occurrence of the second action.
As such, the ‘work’ incumbent upon the reader of the Mishnah is to become the one for whom the stimulus of the first action does indeed give rise to the response of the second.  In particular, it is significant that situation X should give rise to action Y and not to action Z.  In the context of the Mishnah, set in the wake of the Temple’s destruction, an understandable response to seeing places where God formerly wrought miracles for Israel could be one of despair.  That is to say, seeing places of past miracles could potentially lead a person to reflect on the apparent and notable lack of such miracles in the present, and could thus stimulate a response that would be quite distant from grateful praise to God. The obligation to utter this specific blessing can thus be seen as countering the potential tendency toward such an attitude of despair or resentment; the reader or enactor of the Mishnah is instead encouraged to maintain hope in the face of adversity.  Moreover, the Mishnah does not assume that the reader already or currently views the world through “eyes of hope” and would simply be expressing that quality through the blessing.  Rather, it may be that the obligation to utter the blessing helps to transform the person into one who views the world in this way.​[33]​  That is, rather than viewing the action as the ‘ex-pression’ of the possessed virtue, the formulation may instead be presenting the virtue as the ‘in-pression’ that is inculcated by the obligatory action.  Once again, though, while such notions of hope and resistance to despair may be quite easily linked with the functionality of the Mishnah, such terminology is our own description and is not part of the explicit formulation of the mishnaic passage itself.  By presenting itself in terms of actions to be done by the agent, not of qualities possessed by the agent, the Mishnah thus pays little attention to what Foucault called “ethical substance” and which he presumed would characterise any ethical system.  
As the chapter progresses, the Mishnah stipulates various situations in which specific blessings are to be said – for instance, when one sees or encounters comets, earthquakes, and lightning; upon seeing mountains, hills, seas, rivers, and deserts; upon encountering the ocean; upon receiving rains or good tidings; and upon receiving bad tidings. Each of these groupings calls forth its own specific blessing, and the obligation to utter each blessing can be viewed, as in the above analysis, as part of the “ethical work” that goes into the shaping of the ideal ethical individual.  In other instances, we are presented with examples of “negative work” – namely, certain situations with regard to which one is encouraged to resist what might be a natural impulse to utter supplication to God: “To cry over the past is to utter a vain prayer. If a man’s wife is pregnant and he says, [God] grant that my wife bear a male child, this is a vain prayer.”​[34]​  Thus, we could view this as a call to acquire the virtue of serenity, of refraining from supplicating with regard to something that has already happened and instead accepting whatever God has already willed.  Again, though, no quality of the soul is described as in need of being shaped. Rather, it is specifically in relation to an action – in this case, an action linked to restraint – that the Mishnah presents the ideal to be attained or the counter-ideal to be avoided.
Tractate Berakhot does offer one instance that might at first seem to present an exception to the emphasis on ethical work and avoidance of ethical substance that we are identifying. In Berakhot 9:5, the Mishnah states: “It is incumbent on a man to bless [God] for the evil in the same way as for the good, as it says [Deut. 6:5], ‘And thou shalt love the Lord your God with all thy heart [levavcha], etc.’ ‘With all thy heart’ means: with thy two impulses, the evil impulse as well as the good impulse.” The two aspects of the “heart” (spelled here with two instances of the letter bet) are identified as the yetzer ra and the yetzer tov, the evil and the good inclinations. Both can, the Mishnah claims, be mobilised in such a way as to achieve a love of God. If we take “your two inclinations” as inward properties of the self, it might appear that we have encountered an instance of “ethical substance.”  The notion of the yetzer ha-ra in particular has indeed appeared as a life-raft in which previous scholars have placed their hopes of inserting classical rabbinic ethics into a Foucauldian framework. Schofer, for instance, attempts to fit rabbinic discourse into Foucault’s fourfold typology of ethical categories. Yet, he admits defeat in the case of the “ethical substance,” remarking that the even the explicitly ethical-aggadic text Avot de-Rabbi Nathan does not provide a comprehensive treatment of “what people are at origin or by nature”; instead, “innate tendencies are treated on an occasional basis, or they are implied in other concepts.”  He does, however, point to the yetzer as an exception to this rule, highlighting it as a “crucial category...which often denotes a site of innate categories toward transgression.”​[35]​ Thus, by designating it as an “innate” category of the self, Schofer implies that the classical rabbinic texts do indeed think that there is “something there” upon which the “ethical work” is to be performed.
More recently, though, Rosen-Zvi has challenged the idea that the yetzer represents an innate quality of the human self.  Against previous scholars who have drawn links to frameworks of aksesis and desire in late antiquity, he instead argues that “the rabbinic concept of yetzer hara has been incorrectly contextualized, as part of the ancient discourse of self-control and self-fashioning.”​[36]​  Most crucially, while the rabbinic subject may be called upon to battle against the yetzer, the yetzer is not presented as a part of the self; rather, in the rabbinic framework, “[t]he division between self and yetzer is one of the most stable phenomena in the rabbinic discussions of the yetzer, regardless of their specific themes.”​[37]​  With specific reference to Foucauldian accounts of late antique ethics, Rosen-Zvi writes, “Rabbinic yetzer cannot be simply considered part of the ‘new care of the self,’ for its basic decree is not to ‘conquer oneself,’ but rather conquer your yetzer.”​[38]​  With regard to the earliest rabbinic texts, from the tannaitic period, he identifies two competing schools of thought regarding the yetzer.  In one, identified with Rabbi Akiva, the yetzer “occupies a marginal place” and functions as a more “neutral” term for human proclivities or emotional tendencies.​[39]​  By contrast, in texts associated with the school of Rabbi Ishmael, the yetzer takes on a more personified-external and demonological character, and serves to tempt a person towards antinomian actions.​[40]​  In both cases, however, the yetzer should not be regarded as a substantive property of the human being, an ethical substance equivalent to the Greek aphrodisia or the Christian concupiscence. As such, even taking into account rabbinic discourse concerning the yetzer, what remains primary is the ethical work that needs to be undertaken, not the nature of the human being that is to be transformed.
Thus, the Mishnah, ostensibly a “legal” text, possesses deep theological, emotional and ethical implications – but they are defined and described in terms of work and practice, not in terms of substance. The Mishnaic injunctions concerning blessings and prayers throughout chapter nine of Berakhot could conceivably have been phrased as “work on your angry-passions, or your resentful-passions, or your despairing-passions.” However, quite strikingly, the Mishnah does not attend directly to the part of the self upon which ethical action should work, and simply describes the ideal actions that would stem from a properly shaped orientation. There are certain things over which one has control and certain things over which one does not. One’s “initial inclination” in the face of certain situations could be anger, despair, etc.  And so the imperative of blessing (or rather, the statement that this is what the ideal person “says” – in the present tense, not the imperative) serves to indicate the “virtuous work” that is to be enacted by the ideal person. In putting forth such stipulations, the Mishnah does not engage with the question of what ‘part’ of the self should be worked on in order to produce and bring about this proper uttering of blessings. It is the ethical work that is problematised, and the nature of the ethical subject is not proffered by Mishnaic discourse as what Foucault would call an “object for thought.”​[41]​ 
Epistemological break: a conjecture
Berakhot 9:5 continues, after the discussion of blessing both good and evil, with what appears to be a non sequitur: discussing rules for the space where the Second Temple once stood:
A man should not enter the temple mount with his staff or with his shoes on or with his wallet or with his feet dust-stained; nor should he make it a short-cut – and spitting [on it is forbidden] a fortiori.
The non sequitur is removed, however, if the movement of Berakhot 9:5 from discussing blessings to the rules for actions in the space where the Second Temple once stood is considered in terms of the epistemic significance of the Temple. Though it is not necessary for our overall argument here about “ethical substance,” it can be conjectured that the destruction of the Temple can be identified as a significant element of the context in which emerged this peculiar emphasis on the ethical work over the ethical substance. With the destruction of the Temple, which had previously served as the mediating link between the community of Israel and God, there occurred not only a political and religious rupture but also an “epistemological break”: a moment of disruption and reorganisation in the manner and degree to which authorities believe that they can know certain kinds of truth.​[42]​ 
A focus on ethical work rather than ethical substance can be regarded as partly a consequence of this epistemological break, the result of doubts about the capacity of religious authorities to adequately know the ontological and ethical truth of a human being without the direct access to divinity previously provided by the Temple. Though not framed in Foucauldian terms, this is indeed the conclusion of Halberstam, who suggests that “whereas priestly authority rested to a large degree on immediate divine presence in the temple,” the rabbis of the Mishnah recognised the need for epistemic humility in a context of “uncertainty” and “anxiety over the consistent possibility of factually wrong and morally wrong judgment.”​[43]​ She argues, for example, that it was such epistemological anxieties about their capacity to know the moral truth of a human being in the absence of the Temple, rather than “some philosophical or theological aversion to the death penalty,” that led the rabbis of the Mishnah to circumvent biblical laws regarding the death penalty.​[44]​  Likewise, in a broader sense, the dominant rabbinic assumption of a post-Temple lack of access to immediate divine presence may contribute to an epistemological orientation that eschews speculative judgments about the ‘inner nature’ of the human subject in relation to ethical formation. 
Damages
It is possible that a silence can be read as no less significant than the presence of overt textual support for an argument, as Foucault and more recently Henige have argued.​[45]​ Yet silences are ambivalent unless the context is quite clear. Hence arguing that the Mishnah’s inattention to ethical substance is philosophically suggestive is, like all cases of an argumentum e silentio, a tricky move. Sanders has proposed that the Mishnah is fundamentally the record of legal debates: absences from the text do not indicate a “discovery” of philosophical significance, but “are not there because they are not subject to legal discussion.”​[46]​ The Mishnah, Sanders suggests, is simply not of a genre that addresses such issues as ontology and eschatology. Thus, for a reader like Sanders, Berakhot, with its greater focus on explicitly “ethical-theological” topics of prayer and blessing, could seem like an exception to the Mishnah’s general “legal” focus. However, our proposal that the Mishnah deprivileges ethical substance in favour of ethical work can find support also in the (seemingly) more mundanely “legal” tractates of the Mishnah, where, we will show, carefully formulated progressions of legal matters can be linked to deeper “philosophical” matters. Through such formulations, ethical claims are made in a way that appears to strategically circumvent substance where possible in order to lay narrative emphasis on the ethical work.  
Mishnah Bava Kamma 1:4-2:6 provides a good illustration of this phenomenon. This text discusses the ways in which an individual can be liable for damages caused by an animal that he or she owns. The main categories in question involve the difference between an animal that is tam (innocuous) and an animal that is muʿad (noxious, forewarned, harmful). If an animal judged to be muʿad causes damages, the owner must make full restitution for the harm caused; the owner is held responsible for failing to have taken precautions to prevent a “predictable” act of harm. In contrast, if an animal judged to be tam causes damages, the owner is monetarily responsible only for half of the financial harm caused by the animal; in such a case, because the animal was innocuous, strict precautions would not have been warranted, and so the owner is held only partly responsible for the ‘unexpected’ act of harm.  
Given this principle, the question then becomes: in which circumstances are various types of animals considered muʿad, and in which circumstances are they considered tam? For instance, m. Bava Kamma 2:1 states:
With reference to what is the foot muʿad?  [It is muʿad:] to break [things] in the course of walking.  Any animal is muʿad to walk in its usual way and to break [things].  But if it was kicking or pebbles were flying from under its feet and utensils were [in consequence] broken, [only] half-damages will be paid.
In this presentation, an owner of, say, a cow is responsible for any item that cow breaks by trampling it underfoot. Because one should expect that a cow walking along could easily break, for instance, a clay pot that lay in its path, the owner is expected to take precautions to prevent this from happening. As such, if such damage does occur, the owner is deemed to have been negligent and is thus held fully liable for the harm done.  In contrast, other types of damages caused by the leg of the same cow are not deemed to be “expectable.” Since, according to the Mishnah, a cow does not normally kick and break things, its owner would not be held fully responsible if a cow did unexpectedly cause damage by kicking.  Likewise, if a cow is walking along, and pebbles fly out from under its feet and break something, the owner pays only half-damages, since he or she would not be expected to prevent such a rare and unpredictable occurrence. By stipulating differential penalties (half-payment of damages vs. full payment), the Mishnah could easily be seen as implicitly putting forth a specific conception of which actions fall under the “natural” or “normal” behavior of cows and their legs.  Yet in framing the issue in terms of payment of damages, the Mishnah evidences a lack of interest in what a cow or an owner is “essentially” and “in itself” in determining ethical behaviour. It is concerned with the relation between the cow and its human owner, considered in terms of normative legal responsibility of the latter for the actions of the former.
Further cases and examples follow these, elaborating the legal classification of other animals and their various actions.  After studying and actively engaging this series of differentiations and categories, the student will have gradually built up a complex understanding of responsibility, predictability, and negligent behavior. Yet, while this series of discussions might seem useful for courtroom judges seeking to make legal evaluations in civil suits involving animals, its relation to human ethical formation is not immediately evident.  However, after hearing all about the feet, teeth, and horns of oxen, dogs, fowl, bears, and snakes, we then reach m. Bava Kamma 2:6,which reads: “Man is always muʿad [ʾadam muʿad le-ʿolam], whether [he acts] inadvertently or willfully, whether awake or asleep.  If he blinded his neighbour’s eye or broke his articles, full compensation must [therefore] be made.” Coming at the very end of the series, this pericope’s literary placement serves to cast the entire discussion in a philosophical-moral light.  We are now dealing not with a human being’s responsibility for the actions of the animals that she owns, but with a human being’s responsibility for her own actions, with a human’s being’s obligations of ethical self-ownership, as it were.  
Here, the qualitative contrast between human beings and animals stands out strongly. In the case of cattle, for instance, an owner is held responsible for full damages with regard to some types of actions, but not with regard to others – with regard to a cow that consumes fruits or vegetables, which is “natural” and “expected” for cattle, but not with regard to a cow that consumes garments or vessels, which is not a normal or expected behaviour (m. Bava Kamma 2:2). Likewise, jumping down from roofs is a normal and expected behaviour for dogs and kid-goats, but not for cows or sheep (m. Bava Kamma 2:3). In contrast, a human being must take full responsibility with regard to all types of his or her own actions. Because a human being possesses the faculties of forethought and of deliberate choice, there is no ethical-legal dividing line between “typical” and “atypical” actions.  Even if human beings do not “typically” jump down from roofs and break vessels, they must nevertheless pay full damages if they do in fact do so, since they have the ability to foresee the consequences of their acts and can choose whether or not to engage in such actions.  Likewise, while an individual ox is considered noxious with regard to goring only if it has been reported within the past three days as having gored, an individual human being is always (le-ʿolam) held responsible for damage caused by any violent acts, whether or not he had been previously known to act violently. In other words, a human being is expected to take responsibility for every type of action and at every moment in time. Due to the ability to make conscious choices, a human being, unlike other animals, can have no “excuse” for behaviour that causes physical harm to others.  
This radical responsibility extends even to actions that might outwardly appear to be “unintentional.” For instance, a person who accidentally falls off a roof and breaks someone else’s vessels must still pay full damages – here, there is no difference from a person who breaks vessels by deliberately jumping from a roof.  Likewise, if a sleeping person rolls over in his sleep and breaks someone else’s vessels, he must still pay full damages, just as if he had deliberately kicked the vessels while wide awake. As such, a person is expected always to take precautions to avoid causing harm and damage, whether this means avoiding sleeping next to fragile vessels, or putting a parapet around one’s roof. The human being’s responsibility for his bodily actions is thus portrayed as a profoundly important task and expectation that transcends even the spheres of immediate will and consciousness. In this way, all the previously-discussed categories of responsibility and negligence are transformed and re-applied to the human being himself.  For all of the various things for which an animal can be partially responsible, and partially not, the human being is fully responsible. And it is precisely through the contrast of having studied the only-finitely-responsible animals that one can then appreciate the ethical responsibility incumbent on a human being. All of this is phrased in terms of legal-monetary liability, in terms of how much one must pay.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
Whereas texts from other cultures might express issues of responsibility in terms of ethical substance, the Mishnah specifically translates the category of human responsibility and control into purely “legal” formulations and into concrete descriptions of how and what one must pay.  That is to say, the Mishnah “shapes” ethical categories by elaborating a domain of ethical work, even when the specific topic does not seem directly related to human ethics. Despite the weighty philosophical implications of its assertions, the language of the Mishnah itself remains strictly in the sphere of legal-monetary compensation: a human being who causes physical harm is required to pay full damages. The Mishnah never states, for instance, that human beings possess by nature the faculties of rational judgment, or of foresight, or of freedom of choice, nor, for that matter, does it say that animals lack these faculties.  Instead, it is we who have brought such terms into the discussion. In its own framework, by contrast, the discussion is framed primarily in terms of ‘ethical work.’ This is not to suggest that ontology per se is thereby eliminated: for instance, some assumptions about the nature of the human being are organised by the Mishnah through the categorical division between humans and animals. However, the Mishnah’s skilfully and concertedly ordered examples of full-damages and half-damages serves to instil, on a functional-practical level, a radical conception of human responsibility and of the human being’s difference from other animals, yet without having to describe or define the inherent ontological attributes of human beings that would make possible ethical capacity and expectation.  We can therefore posit that the Mishnah is operating with an ontology that is other than substantialist.
This pattern that we identify, moreover, fits well with recent scholarship arguing that the Mishnah should be viewed as dynamically integrating law with narrative, halakhah with aggadah, by means of an ideologically-aware process of editorial ordering of its material.​[47]​ As such, the Mishnah is able to put forth “philosophical” or “theological” positions precisely through, and not in spite of, its apparently “legal” genre.  Indeed, it might be suggested that a mode of intellectual reflection that sought to emphasize ethical work and to sidestep ethical substance could conceivably find distinct advantages in a “legal” medium for philosophical thought and expression: while indicative propositions, typical of much philosophical writing, can have a tendency to emphasize the static or substantial nature of what “is” the case, the prevalence of normative and casuistic statements in legal genres allow for a greater focus on the “ought” and thus on ethical work.

Towards an ethics without substance
In drawing together the threads of our discussion of Berakhot and Bava Kamma, it is possible to run them through and against Foucault’s framework. With the ethical substance left relatively unproblematised, the focus of Mishnahic discourse lies instead upon the precise nature of the ethical work that must be carried out in the face of whatever countervailing forces may be present within the self. This helps to explain the uncertainty regarding the genre of the Mishnah: seen in a Foucauldian light, it is a compilation of texts and traditions which serves as a switch-point for different genres of ethical work, which do not presume knowledge of the nature of the human being who engages in practices. A consequence is that the hinge between ontology and ethics enacted by the play between ethical substance and telos, present and ideal forms of subjectivity, is thereby fractured. The Mishnah is addressed to a subject with certain features of privilege, such as being human and male, but whose essence or content as a subject is not only rather unknown but unproblematised – it does not itself matter all that much so long as the different, intersecting forms of ethical work are enacted. The subject of halakha is, in this sense, taken to be a potential stranger by his or her own ethical discourse.
As a result, Mishnahic thought is suggestive of an approach to morality that, to some degree, bypasses the hinge between ethics and ontology presumed upon by Aristotle and reproduced in Foucault’s taxonomy. In arguing such, we do not wish to dispute claims, for example by Kristeva and Boyarin, about the normalising consolidation of power that can occur within texts with a dialogic form.​[48]​ Our suggestion is not that the Mishnah simply and straightforwardly presents an emancipatory model for all contemporary ethics, but that it can be discerned as a signpost for contemporary work interested in decoupling ethics from ontology. We acknowledge the risk that asking a past text to speak to the present may cause scholars to “project their own conceptual and ideological fantasies onto the surface of the Mishnah and then mistake them for artefacts that have been excavated from the text itself.”​[49]​ Nonetheless, even the most arch of historicists, Dunn, has admitted that it is possible to gain ethical insight from texts that were written to address issues and questions that may no longer be our own.​[50]​ Foucault identified this potential for signposting as precisely his goal in exploring historical moralities and ethics: moral and ethical systems encoded in documents from the past “cannot exactly be reactivated but at least constitute, or help to constitute, a certain point of view which can be very useful.”​[51]​ 
Conclusion
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